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swimming pool. This case is cited by Dean Prosser 3 as an example
of a court following the public invitation theory in regard to the
definition of an invitee. In another case, 4 the West Virginia court
stated that
invitation is the act of one who solicits or incites others to
enter upon, remain in, or make use of, his property or
structures thereon, or who so arranges the property or the
means of access to it or of transit over it as to induce the
reasonable belief that he expects or intends that others shall
come upon it or pass over it.2"
There has been no case since the adoption of the new Restatement of Torts definition of an invitee in which the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has stated its position in regard to
what constitutes an invitee. It should be pointed out, however,
that even in cases in which the court has ruled that a business
visitor was an invitee, it did not necessarily exclude a public
invitee. There are also remarks by the court cited above, which
indicate that it does follow the public invitation test as well as
the business visitor test. In light of the added impetus and credibility given to the public invitation concept of an invitee by the
American Law Institute, it is possible that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals may in the future formally adopt the
new Restatement definition of an invitee, as did the California
Supreme Court in the principal case.
Robert Bruce King

Torts-Rebuttable Presumption of Child's Incapacity for
Contributory Negligence
P, a twelve year old child, rode a bicycle into an intersection
and was injured when the bicycle collided with an automobile
driven by D. In directing a verdict for D the trial court ruled as
a matter of law that P was guilty of contributory negligence. Held,
reversed for further proceedings. The contributory negligence of
23

Paossis, op. cit. supra note 7.
24Waddelf
v. New River Co., 141 W. Va. 880, 93 S.E.2d 473 (1956).
25
Id. at 883, 93 S.E.2d at 476.
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P was a jury question. The doctrine of rebuttable presumption of
incapacity for contributory negligence of children between the ages
of seven to fourteen is abandoned. Such children are expected
to exercise the degree of care of ordinary prudent children of the
same age, intelligence and experience under like or similar circumstances. Williamson v. Garland, 402 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1966).
The rebuttable presumption of incapacity for contributory negligence of children between the ages of seven and fourteen, abandoned by the Kentucky court, is identical to the rule in West
Virginia, with the exception that the lower age limit of this class
has not been conclusively established in West Virginia. While it
is well settled in West Virginia that the rebuttable presumption
of incapacity for contributory negligence exists in favor of the
child under the age of fourteen,' the lower age limit has not been
definitely established.
Prior to 1922 the lower age limit had been set at seven2 However, in Prunty v. Tyler Traction Co.3 the West Virginia court,
by dictum, declared that a child three years and four months
old may be found guilty of contributory negligence. The court in
Pierson v. Liming4 definitely abandoned the old rule which set the
lower age limit at seven years, and declared that "whether a child
is capable of exercising any care is determined by the consideration of its age, intelligence, experience, discretion, previous training, maturity, alertness and the nature of the danger encountered."
The West Virginia court noted that this was the position taken
by a majority of jurisdictions. Under this rule the lower age limit
would vary in different situations.
This seemed to be a sensible rule and one easy to follow. However, four years later in Marsh v. Riley5 the West Virginia court,
by dictum, indicated that a child three years and four months old
could not be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
There have been no cases discovered since the Marsh case involving the contributory negligence of a child under the age of seven.
I Pierson v. Liming, 113 W. Va. 145, 167 S.E. 131 (1932); Prunty v.
Tyler Traction Co., 90 W. Va. 194, 110 S.E. 570 (1922); Ewing v. Lanark
Fuel Co., 65 W. Va. 726, 65 S.E. 200 (1909).
2 Ewing v. Lanark, supra note 1.
3 90 W. Va. 194, 110 S.E. 570 (1922).
4 113 W. Va. 145, 149, 167 S.E. 131, 134 (1932).
5118 W. Va. 52, 188 S.E. 748 (1936); Note, 44 W. VA. L. Q. 55
(1937).
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A few cases involving children over seven appear to limit the
rebuttable presumption to between the ages of seven and fourteen.6 The general rule set forth in Pierson v.Liming' has not been
departed from in other subsequent cases involving children over
seven.8 In Shaw v.Perfetti,9 which appears to be the latest West
Virginia case in point, the court merely declared that a child
between seven and eight years of age is protected by the rebuttable presumption.
Since none of the decisions subsequent to Pierson v. Liming'"
has involved children under the age of seven, the decisions which
appear to limit the lower age to seven should not be authoritative.
Much of the confusion surrounding presumptions is due to the
use of inaccurate terminology. A few definitions distinguishing a
true rebuttable presumption from other procedural phrases sometimes called presumptions is in order before a determination can
be made of the procedural effect of a presumption in West Virginia.
"A presumption is the assumption of a fact resulting from a rule
of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.""
The term conclusive presumption is used to describe the assumption of a fact from a basic fact where the presumed fact cannot be
rebutted.' 2 This is not a true presumption and should never be
called a presumption without including the word conclusive. Another term which is sometimes called a presumption is the inference. An inference is used to describe the procedure by which
the assumed fact may be presumed but the presumption is not
mandatory. The rebuttable or true presumption is mandatory until
certain specified conditions are fulfilled.'3
The existence of the presumption will result in a peremptory
ruling by the judge for the plaintiff if the defendant offers no
6 Buckley v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 324 F.2d 244 (1963); Pitzer v. M.D.
& Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951).
Tompkies
7
113 W. Va. 145, 167 S.E. 131 (1932).
8
Armstead v. Holbert, 146 W. Va. 582, 122 S.E.2d 43 (1961); Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Peters, 206 F.2d 366 (1953); French v. Sinkford, 132 W. Va. 66, 54 S.E. 2d 381 (1948).
9 147 W. Va. 87, 125 S.E.2d 778 (1962).
,o113 W. Va. 145, 178 S.E. 131 (1932).
" UNIFORM RULms OF EVIDENCE rule 13.
'2Morgan, Foreword,in MoDEL CODE OF EviENcE 52 (1942).

,3Ibid.
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evidence to rebut it. However, the effect of the presumption in
situations in which the defendant does offer rebutting evidence
is not clear. There are two views concerning the weight of evidence the defendant must introduce to rebut the presumption.
The prevailing approach, advocated by Thayer, is that the presumption is merely a procedural device for determining who must
come forward with the evidence, and loses all its effect as soon
as such evidence is introduced." The weight of evidence needed
to overcome the presumption is that from which a jury could
reasonably find the non-existence of the presumed fact. This view
was adopted by the American Law Institute" and is supported
6
by Wigmore.'
The contrary position is that proposed by Morgan and suggested
in the Uniform Rules of Evidence."7 While Thayer would have the
presumption shift only the burden of producing or coming forward with the evidence, Morgan would have it shift the burden
of persuasion also. The weight of evidence necessary to rebut
a presumption under this view would be a preponderance of the
evidence. The difference is that the presumption would still have
effect after the defendant's rebutting evidence had been presented.
The defendant will not prevail unless the judge is convinced that
he has overcome the presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence. 8
In Mulroy v. Co-Operative Transit Co.,' 9 the court held that a

"rebuttable presumption is not evidence of a fact, but purely a
conclusion, having no probative force, and designed only to
sustain the burden of proof until evidence is introduced tending
to overcome it." The weight of evidence necessary for rebuttal
is defined as "substantial or credible." The meaning of, "substantial
or credible" may be determined by considering other cases involving presumptions in West Virginia.
In Shaw v. Perfett2 the court held that when a presumption is
' 4 THAym, A PREmmNARY TBEAnSE ON Evmmc
LAW 5§ 313 (1898).
1 MoDEL CoDE OF EVmENCE rule 704 (1942).
169 WIGMOrE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485-2494 (3d ed. 1940).

AT Tm COmmON

17 Supra note 12. Morgan's view is not accepted fully, but only so far
as the basic facts from which the presumption is made have any probative

value. See UNnwonm RuLEs OF EvmENcE rule 14(a).
" Morgan, Foreword, in MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE 52 (1942).
19 142 W. Va. 165, 176, 95 S.E.2d 63, 70 (1956).
20 147 W. Va. 87, 125 S.E.2d 778 (1962).
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rebutted by uncontradicted evidence the presumption disappears
and it no longer is a matter for jury determination. In Dwight v.
Hazlet' the court held that a rule based on a presumption becomes impotent whenever facts to the contrary are established to
rebut the presumption. In the Dwight case, Wigmore is cited for
the proposition that no presumption will stand in the face of facts.
The language of these cases indicates that the West Virginia law
is in accord with the view advocated by Thayer and adopted by
the American Law Institute. If West Virginia is in accord with
Thayer, then the weight of evidence needed to rebut a presumption would be that from which a jury could reasonably find the
non-existence of the presumed fact. This is essentially the same
weight of evidence necessary to submit any question of fact to
the jury.
In West Virginia, a presumption disappears from the case when
evidence is introduced which rebuts it. Accordingly, it would be
improper for the judge to instruct the jury regarding the presumption when such evidence is produced,2 2 although many trial judges
do instruct the jury in this situation. Shaw v. Perfetti23 is an indication that this could be prejudicial error in a close case. This
question does not appear to have been directly passed upon by
the West Virginia court.
If the West Virginia court were to abandon the rebuttable presumption of incapacity in children under fourteen years of age,
the decision would have very little practical effect because the
weight of evidence that the defendant must produce to establish
prima facie contributory negligence in the absence of the presumption is the same as that which would be required to overcome the
presumption.
Jerry David Hogg

107 W. Va. 192, 147 S.E. 877 (1929).
MmAsmu.L, Fn-zmuH & HELViN, EvmENcE
VmomA 215 (1954).
23 147 W. Va. 87, 125 S.E.2d 778 (1962).
21
22

iN
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